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iranska vojska Poslano: 04-01-2009 21:41



evo, na zahtjev bilog, iranska vojska nekad i sada...

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Bluffer’s guide: Fortress Iran 2

Amateur unbiased analysis and illustrations. All pics by me unless obviously a photo . Constructive feedback and discussion encouraged.

Air Defence Update
This section should be considered as in addition to the previous ‘Fortress Iran’ HERE

S-300 SAM systemCONFIRMED!
There have been consistent reports of Iranian interest in the advanced Russian S-300 SAM system and even rumors of deployment but these have been unsubstantiated for years. As of Jan 2009 it can be confirmed via commercial satellite imagery that Iran does possess S-300 SAMs. The likely model is S-300 PMU-2 although the slightly older PMU-1 is a possibility. The latest S-400 cannot be ruled out but this seems less likely. The likely source of this system remains Russia although China also manufactures S-300 PMU-1 systems.

The S-300 PMU-2 SAM system is among the most feared, and hyped, air-defense weapons in service anywhere and represents a quantum leap for Iranian air defences. Iran reported to have inducted into service a long range SAM system, by implication an indigenous one, earlier this year. Iranian press reports are commonly inaccurate, especially about the origin of technologies (as are the press in most countries!!!) so this may tie in with the S-300 system.
Site analysis
Firstly I’m surprised the site is so close to the nuclear site, which is not a weapons related site. The whole area of Bushehr is heavily defended by multiple I-Hawk and even SA-5 (S-200) SAMs and numerous AAA sites. It is possible that the S-300 site here replaces the other SAMs although because it’s a new site (converted from AAA) we can assume that the other SAM systems are still present. Additionally, the Bushehr location allows the long range S-300 missiles to cover most of the Persian Gulf effectively deterring strike aircraft from taking the ‘straight across’ route from US or the Gulf States, or Israel.

Like the SA-5 in Iranian service, the known S-300 site is noteworthy in that it has fewer launch positions than would be expected for S-300 in service elsewhere. There are two obvious firing pans (as per Iranian S-200) although each is designed for two missile TELs which means up to 16 missiles ‘ready to fire’. Additionally the S-300 is much more mobile than other Iranian systems so additional launchers could easily be set up nearby and networked in. There is only one elevated radar ramp, presumably for the fire-control radar. The radar in this case looks to me more like the ‘Cheeseboard’ system rather than a ‘Flap lid’ series, hence my belief that it is S-300 PMU-2 not PMU-1. Additionally, the ‘Big bird’ surveillance radar effectively rules out older version of the S-300, although not conclusively.

Alternative hypothesis
Alternatively, the fresh satellite images are not Russian supplied S-300 but an Iranian clone/cousin of the system. That Iran is developing an indigenous “S-300” has been reported, and possibly with a lot of Russian assistance although we should strictly treat it as a rumor. The system would be similar in capability to the S-300 and share many technologies but may be quite different in end product – akin to the Chinese HQ-9 program. The below illustration shows a ‘what-if’ of an “Iranianized” S-300 system:

Iranian garage-build CIWS
Iran uses a large number of AAA particular to defend static high-value installations, such as nuclear sites. Further, Iran has purchased much more advanced SA-15 and Pantsyr S-1E short-range SAM systems. However, these are expensive and not easily reverse engineered, so Iran has also pursued numerous indigenous AAA projects. The main ones, and most successful it seems, have been simply reverse engineering the ubiquitous Russian Zu-23-2 23mm gun and the Swiss 35mm Oerlikon ‘Sky guard’ system. However, these offer little defense against cruise missiles and PGMs. Perhaps with this in mind Iran has pursued several lines of development to improve accuracy, or volume of fire.

Fully automating the 100mm AAA
This project has only recently been unveiled. Essentially the obsolete crew-intensive KS-1 gun has been modernized so that it has fully autonomous transverse, elevation and firing. Coupled with a fire control system this allows much more accurate fire (and by implication greater effective range) than with a human crew. It also seems possible that a guided shell is used, although this is unconfirmed. If deployed in numbers this system will greatly enhance Iranian SHORAD.

Super-size Zu-23
The Zu-23-2 is a pretty decent AAA, but Iranian engineers have come up with a fiendishly cool idea: Why not bolt three Zu-23s together, so that you have three times the volume of fire? The Zu-23-6 uses a S-60 57mm AAA gun carriage, and has an assumed cyclic rate of fire of 6,000 rds per minute. That’s more than the Phalanx CIWS!

Another project involving improving the Zu-23 is to make it fully autonomous, although it’s not clear if this has progressed beyond trials.

There is also an Zu-23 with MANPAD missiles attached although it’s not clear if this has entered service.

Increase in Iranian air defence sites from 2003 – 2006 and beyond
Iran greatly increased the number of AAA sites from 2003 onwards, especially around nuclear sites. In part this was because once Iran’s nuclear programs were revealed, there was no longer a need for ‘low key’ installations. The ‘historic imagery’ feature on Google Earth lets compare satellite imagery across time:

Imagery of Natanz nuclear site is particularly interesting as it shows the construction of the ‘secret’ underground complex to house the nuclear centrifuges. This was spotted by Western observers and the nature of the site is now well documented.

I previously posted an analysis of the air defences around Natanz, identifying a mix of 23mm and 35mm AAA. This recent internet-sourced photo confirms the presence of the latter type. Always noce when analysis of satellite imagery is confirmed!

As well as AAA sites, the SAM sites covering the area are also quite recent:

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Elsewhere in Iran we see a similar pattern, with many air defence positions being recently built:

Shiraz Air Base:



Strategic missile forces

Warning: Opinion
Iran has a rapidly maturing missile industry providing Iranian forces with credible theatre-level missile coverage. Whilst the range of the missiles may not qualify as strategic in some analysts’ minds there can be little doubt that potential recipients of Iran’s missiles and indeed Iran’s strategists see things differently. Being on the receiving end of a ballistic missile should not be trivialized, but by the same token Iran’s conventionally armed missiles offer little strategic advantage or war-winning potential. The lack of warning before a missile strikes and the perceived helplessness to protect yourself from it has terrorized thousands of people across many wars and decades, from the V2s of World War 2, to the Scuds of the ’91 Gulf War. In fact the people of Tehran know what it’s like to be on the receiving end of Scuds having survived over a hundred in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran repaid Bagdad in kind with imported Scuds which actually laid the roots for Iran’s indigenous missile programmes.

However, despite their terrorizing nature, in every case where conventionally armed ballistic missiles have been used in war they have had no appreciable impact on the outcome of the war, being as often (more often!) employed by the losing side than the winning one. Some may dispute this citing the Iran-Iraq war where arguably Iraqi Scud/Al-Hussein missile strikes forced Iran back to diplomacy in the late ‘80s, but that can be argued either way. This is not a sound argument for dismissing their employment, but it provides some perspective on the often alarmist media reports of long range missiles. There is however a very simple way to turn even a single ballistic missile into a potentially war-winning strategic weapon and the answer lies in nuclear physics.

Nuclear missiles
There is widespread agreement that Iran is pursuing nuclear arms, but the exact pace of development is open to debate – indeed like North Korea the Tehran government is probably considering the optimal time to conduct the giveaway nuclear tests which will invariably trigger another round of international sanctions and partial exile. The Iranian government denies it of course, but few even among Iran’s fans buy that tale. How much does Iran care about isolation? Probably not as much as it cares about restoring the strategic balance with its primary foe Israel. So why then is Iran appearing to drag its heels in nuclear development, and yet pursue a missile building programme that is geared first and foremost to nuclear deterrence? Israel, though undeclared, almost certainly has nuclear missiles of her own targeted at Tehran (Jericho II and III). In fact we can speculate that it is a feared first strike by Israel in the event of Iranian nuclear tests that is deferring progress. In the cold light of day it is obvious that militarily Israel has a substantial advantage over Iran in a ballistic missile exchange, with mature nuclear missile technology, anti-ballistic-missile defences and of course uncle Sam in the background. However, just one Iranian nuke getting through could at least provide a death-grip defence for Iran; a scenario that equates to ‘mutually assured destruction’ deterrence (MAD). Some hawks who either don’t remember the cold war, or where too young or too stupid to understand the inhumanity of the threat of nuclear holocaust hanging over people’s everyday lives, may theorize that Iran being the larger and more remote country can sustain relatively more nuclear strikes than the tiny densely populated Israel. Indeed, that was Chairman Mao’s logic for wanting a nuclear war with USSR (yes, he was a nutcase). However one nuke on Tehran is a humanitarian disaster not worth thinking about so it’s idiotic if Iran contemplates any sort of offensive nuclear action. However if we consider the Iranian governments’ sense of duty towards the anti-Israeli cause, and the fact that Iran herself is surround by nuclear powers (Israel, Russia, Pakistan, India as well as US, France, China and UK who have truly global reach), it’s easy to understand why the Iranian military is pursuing long range missiles.

Whilst Iran’s hostility to US is in plain sight, there is no credible evidence to suggest that Iran is pursing missiles that can reach the US. That may one day change, but for the moment intermediate-range missiles seem to be the primary concern. It is in this aspect that Iranian priorities differ from North Koreas; to paraphrase an expert on ACIG, North Korea is hoping for a chess piece to somehow checkmate the US with the threat of intercontinental strike, Iran is focused more on Israel. In order to hit US mainland targets Iran would require a missile with a range in excess of 9,000km:

In order to counter Iran’s missiles Israel developed the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system and other countries in the region are also arranging similar defences. UAE has reportedly ordered the equivalent US made THAAD system and the US is intending to base its own ABM systems in Poland (although Russia is a more obvious consideration for US, Poland happens to be on the direct route from Iran to NE USA).

Overview of main missiles

Shahab-3 missile
The Shahab-3 (aka Ghadr) is the main strategic missile in Iranian service. A clone of the North Korean NoDong-1, itself an evolution of the older Scud series. The Shahab-3 has a likely range in the region of about 1,500km although 2,000km+ is often claimed.
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Unlike the Scud, the Shahab-3 is carried on a towed lorry trailer. The design of these trailers varies so greatly that it seems to me that each is a separate conversion of an existing articulated lorry trailer, rather than a mass produced product. Some launchers (“TELs”) are camouflaged to look like regular civilian trucks:
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The Shahab family of missiles is quite confusing, in part because Iran frequently unveils ‘new’ versions some of which may not be operational variants, and because the Western media/defence observers are prone to speculation, inventing their own names. Here is a short sharp explanation from ‘Eagle2005’ on IranMilitaryForum:
Shahab-3= NoDong missile imported/assembled from N. Korean kits (1000-1300km)
Shahab-3A= First Iranian built version, better range thanks to various sizes of warheads and possible better guidance system (unconfirmed) 1300-1500km
Shahab-3B= Uses the "baby bottle" REV also known as Rocket-Nozzle that allows it to change its trajectory in flight and throwing off ABM systems and likely uses a INS/GPS aided guidance system (1700-2000km)
Ghadr-1= Identical to above but slightly longer and possibly slightly larger warhead (1800-2000km)

This is a more advanced version of the Shahab-3, also sometimes referred to as Shahab-3M. The main feature is a new re-entry vehicle, reportedly capable of maneuvering to thwart an anti-missile intercept such as the Israeli Arrow ABM system. Some sources say that this rocket is two-stage although it seems likely that the second stage refers to the re-entry vehicle which may have rocket thrusters. The missile possibly employs GPS (global positioning from satellites, has issues if US ‘turns off’ civilian GPS) and almost certainly INS (internal navigation) for greater accuracy.

The Shahab-3/3B give Iran the capability to hit targets in Israel:
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For a great analysis of Saudi ballistic missile sites try here HERE
I’ve drawn Israel’s range at the commonly quoted 1,500km which is a fraction too short to reach Tehran, but I feel it’s likely that in reality Israeli nuclear missiles range all the way across Iran.

The most widely reported Iranian ballistic missile site appears to be at Tabriz in NE Iran:
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Initially the missiles used an old HQ-2 SAM site:

Note, I am not confident in the ID of the vehicles, they are actually a bit on the short side for Shahab-3).

More recently at least two missile silos have been built to increase survivability. It’s not clear what type of missiles are hosed in the silos but it is most likely Shahab-3B based on the timing of their construction:

The Ghadr-1(’Might’, as in “mighty” rather than “might work”) is outwardly very similar to the Shahab-3B although about 300mm longer. The missile was also test launched on the pretext of the Iranian space program under the designation ‘Kavoshgar ‘. Fars news, a semi-government Iranian news agency, claim that this is solid fuelled and has a range of 2,000km, although video of the Kavoshgar suggest that it retains a liquid-fuel engine as per the Shahab-3; perhaps the solid fuel engine refers to a small second stage. Iran reported that the Kavoshgar rocket reached an altitude of 200-250 kilometers.

There is another “Ghadr” missile described as the Ghadr-110 although I have been unable to pin down exactly what that is.

Shahab-4, 5 & 6
There has been consistent speculation of increased range Shahab missiles, most likely using multiple stages. These have rumor increment the version number every few years; we are currently at Shahab-6. This assumption is often supported by the close links between the Iranian and North Korean missile programs. Ironically it is now Iran that is assisting the North Koreans with their “space” programme not vice versa, although North Korea is still employing its own rockets. Iran certainly has the technology to build multi-stage ‘Shahab’ rockets as proven by the successful launch of the Omid satellite on a ‘Safir’ rocket, really just a Shahab with an extra stage on it. The Safir is launched from a typical Iranian missile TEL although it was painted white to give a more civilian look to it:

We can theorize that the same approach could be employed for a much longer ranged missile, perhaps with a 5,000km range:

Yet no Shahab-4, 5 or 6 has ever been seen and there’s no proof that Iran is actually following the design path of ever larger liquid-fuelled missiles as North Korea is. Instead Iran has recently showcased a solid fuel missile, the Sejil:

The Sejil is a much more modern concept than the Shahab series, using a multi-stage solid fuel rocket motor. The missile is about the size of the Shahab, although probably a bit longer, and appears to have the same re-entry vehicle as the Shahab-3B.

There is speculation that the Sejil uses liquid fuelled thrusters for control but this is unconfirmed, more likely in my view it uses TVC paddles like other ballistic missiles. Range is unknown but likely to be similar to, if not greatly exceeding, the Shahab-3B. It is not yet clear if the missile is in operational service but it appears a more likely future development avenue than the liquid fuelled Shahab series.

As well as the medium ranged Shahabs and Sejil missiles, Iran still employs significant numbers of the older, smaller and shorter ranged Scud missiles, known as Shahab-1 (equiv: Scud-C) and Shahab-2 (equiv: Scud-C+). Iran likely received its first Scuds from Libya during the Iran-Iraq war but soon became a customer of North Korea for this technology, even setting up a Scud factory (North Korean Scuds have local designations such as Hwasong-6 ).

Although Iran employs the classic Soviet Maz TEL, there is at least one indigenous platform used for the Shahab-1/2:

Zelzal-1,2 & 3
The Zelzal series of battlefield rockets are loosely equivalent to the Soviet FROG series. A wide range of TELs are employed, some painted in civilian ‘disguise’.

The missiles caused some international amusement when four were fired simultaneously during a military exercise, except one failed to launch. The Iranian press photoshopped it out and added a fake missile launch, thus emphasizing the failure.

Fatah A-110
The Fatah A-110 is a guided missile similar in concept to the SS-21 ‘Scarab’ missile. The Fatah A-110 uses a solid fuel rocket and probably combines INS and GPS guidence (some sources say electro-optical guidance) and has a range of about 100km. The first missiles were mounted on an HQ-2 SAM launcher which further reduces mobility, but more recently truck-launched versions have appeared. The missile appears to be in widespread service.
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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 21:43

Ti si bog .... Beer

Ovako se otvaraju teme ... međutim nažalost moram na pivu ... pa do tipkanja ...

Pijem pušim .... živim bolje nego ministar.

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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 21:54

I onda netko bude rekao da oni to rade solo radi el.energije.



Zasto u Hrvatskoj nebi bilo poslijednje vecere? Zato jer bi Isusa izdali jos u jutro.

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Registriran(a): 12.12.2003.
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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:00

sve to bude na kraju....bum-tres-zemljotres...

Zasto u Hrvatskoj nebi bilo poslijednje vecere? Zato jer bi Isusa izdali jos u jutro.

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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:05

u glavnom lik posli na isti način analizira zrakoplovstvo i mornaricu.... kliknite gore da bi vidili prvi dio ove teme...



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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:12

pa, podastri dokaze! Smile



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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:15

svaka čast za blog. Par ovih jebenih iranskih stvarčica tipa oni automatski PZO i anti raketni 100mm i 30 mm topići, sve je ovdje...

Iranska vojska će biti važan faktor .. u budućnosti bliskog istoka...  Zemlja koja po tehnologiji je među prvima u svijetu...

ugl Ninikove ubody ovo na sticky Yes



Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:21

...pretpostavka je majka svih zajeba...

A ova analiza je krcata pretpostavkama.

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Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:24


...pretpostavka je majka svih zajeba...

A ova analiza je krcata pretpostavkama.

Ja mislim da su u ovoj analizi i pretpostavke krcate pretpostavkama.


Erblicket die töchter des firmaments...!

Top 500 Contributor
Registriran(a): 09.12.2008.
Poruke : 9.458
Odgovor na Re: iranska vojska 04-01-2009 22:25

o iranskom naoružanju se jako malo zna... ljudi malo ratuju Big Smile



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